By Maung Dagon MPA (Article)
“The military must completely withdraw from politics. It must face justice for the crimes it has committed. Only then dialogue can happen,” said Dr. Soe Thuya Zaw, one of the commanders of People Defense Force – Mandalay (PDF-Mandalay), expressing his views to the BBC.
He is one of the young people who took up arms against the State Administration Council (SAC) following the violent suppression of protests against the 2021 military coup, where protestors were shot and dispersed.
He made this remark after SAC made its first invitation in over three years since the coup, calling on PDF to join the political dialogue on 26 September.
At the time when SAC is facing difficulties on military, economic, and political fronts, China has provided significant support to the council.
Behind this support lie multiple strategic exchanges, and political analysts suggest that SAC’s invitation may be one of these exchanges.
Before 2020, Myanmar still owed China nearly $4 billion dollars, and now China has offered an additional $3 billion in loans to help the struggling SAC.
Although China itself is facing challenges with its domestic economy, including high unemployment and debt-ridden local governments, it continues to back SAC to ensure SAC’s stability.
So, what does China stand to gain from the military council?
To understand this, we must first examine historical events.
In 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party won the civil war and came to power, U Nu’s Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League( AFPLF) government was among the first to recognize it.
U Nu’s government, under pressure from left-wing armed groups, sought to show that it was not a capitalist regime allied with the West, U Nu’s incline for Marxist principles, combined with a desire to maintain friendly relations with the potential powerful neighbor, led to the recognition of the Chinese Communist Party as the legitimate government of China.
U Nu’s government even refused American mediation to assist General Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang forces in fighting with CCP by letting them operate within Burma’s borders.
Additionally, by gaining victory over Kuomintang, U Nu’s government solidified its status as a trusted ally of the newly established Chinese Communist government.
However, things changed in 1962 when General Ne Win seized power.
Unlike U Nu, General Ne Win was not trusted by the Chinese government.
Consequently, China began providing support to the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), and when General Ne Win responded by creating the Anti-Chinese riot, China provided massive arms and supplies to BCP.
So the Northeastern Military Region of BCP was born and General Ne Win’s Myanmar Military had to fight their almost winning civil war with all efforts once again.
This resulted in a prolonged civil war, draining Myanmar’s national resources for military spending, and, combined with economic mismanagement, reduced the country to one of the poorest in the world.
In the 1980s when China began changing its policies, opening up its economy to the world.
The Burmese Communist Party, disillusioned with China’s policy shifts, criticized these changes.
Eventually, China withdrew its support, leading to the collapse of the party.
However, the regime under Ne Win had already faced public discontent due to poverty, rampant corruption within the bureaucracy, and repressive policies, leading to a loss of popular support and collapse even before the communist party collapsed.
Following the collapse of the Burmese Communist Party and Military Coup,in the 1990s, China began to accelerate its industrial growth, particularly aimed at increasing its foreign exports. This period marked the implementation of China’s outward-looking strategy, capitalizing on the momentum gained from its expanding industrial base.
China is set to expand its industrial operations not only domestically but also in foreign countries.
At the same time, the Myanmar military regime faced international sanctions for refusing to hand over power to the winning party in the 1990 elections.
That led China and Myanmar to enter into agreements under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) from the 1990s onward, with Chinese investments flooding into Myanmar with massive amounts.
Meanwhile, China began mediating ceasefire agreements between the Myanmar military and various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) along the border (or) exerting pressure on these groups to cease hostilities.
For its economy, China opens border gates in both areas of Military controlled and EROs controlled and collaborate with both sides.
As a result, Myanmar’s natural resources began flowing into China through various means.
China processed these cheap raw materials at a lower cost than international markets and profited immensely by refining them domestically.
For Myanmar, trade with China became a critical revenue source for both the military government and the EAOs along the border, with these funds, they used to purchase arms and expand military strength.
Although the internal conflict paused during the reign of Senior General Than Shwe, there was no lasting political resolution.
U Than Shwe, using revenue from the sale of natural resources, modernized the Myanmar military. Despite international sanctions, Myanmar continued to purchase arms from countries like China.
By the time of U Than Shwe, the military had become better equipped with more modern weaponry, and due to the success of propagandas, the military academies, such as the Defence Services Academy, saw increasing numbers of graduates with over 2000 cadets annually.
However, under the corrupt and inefficient military bureaucracy, the country’s economy and social development continued to decline.
In 2007, the rising cost of fuel, combined with increased transportation fees by the government, led to a mass protest led by Buddhist monks.
It was the largest popular uprising since the 8888 Uprising, and the military brutally suppressed it.
Public trust in the military was nearly nonexistent, forcing the regime to initiate rapid changes to preserve its power.
Thus, under the guise of responding to the devastation of Cyclone Nargis, the military hurriedly imposed the 2008 Constitution, entrenching the military’s grip on power.
In 2009, the military pressured ceasefire ethnic armed groups to transform into border guard forces, reigniting the flames of civil war.
However, in 2010, U Than Shwe visited China, giving assurances to Chinese businesses and persuaded China , Myanmar’s long-term strategic ally under international sanctions, to support their changes.
In 2009, prior to Senior General Than Shwe’s visit to China, an agreement was reached on the Myitsone Dam project, which was seen as a potential solution to the internal legitimacy issues for the upcoming government of U Thein Sein.
Myitsone Dam project became the first major source of intense pressure for the U Thein Sein administration, facing significant opposition from the public, civil society organizations, and various resistance groups.
But It can also be viewed as a political test orchestrated by Senior General Than Shwe.
When U Thein Sein became president in March 2011, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) wrote a letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao, asking him to suspend the Myitsone Dam project due to concerns it would exacerbate the civil war.
However, the Myanmar military soon sent troops to the entrance of KIO headquarters in Laiza, threatening conflict.
Shortly after, U Thein Sein announced the suspension of the Myitsone Dam project during his administration.
This decision gained U Thein Sein’s government widespread domestic approval, with the public viewing the government as more aligned with their interests than the previous military regime.
Additionally, this move sent a signal to ethnic armed groups that political and economic power within the country lay with the government.
Around the same time, U Thein Sein released Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest and invited her to join the political process under the framework of the 2008 Constitution.
In 2012, the NLD entered parliament through a by-election, further legitimizing Thein Sein’s government in the eyes of the international community.
In another word, despite the questionable legitimacy of the 2010 general election, U Thein Sein’s government had successfully secured both domestic and international legitimacy.
In a way, U Thein Sein had passed the political test set by U Than Shwe.
However, the U Thein Sein government, and the military, also laid the groundwork for future ethnic and religious conflicts that would later result in the Rohingya genocide.
However, during U Thein Sein’s administration, these conflicts were managed and kept under control to the extent that the government deemed necessary.
Between 2012 and early 2014, religiously motivated violence, notably in Rakhine and Meiktila, occurred in various parts of the country, orchestrated in a systematic manner.
Behind these incidents were groups such as Ma Ba Tha, supported by the military.
These nationalist movements portrayed Buddhists as being threatened by Islamic extremists, while simultaneously portraying Buddhists as the aggressors from the Muslim perspective.
Though border conflicts flared, these were largely efforts to showcase the strength of the Myanmar military.
The Thein Sein government also initiated efforts for a nationwide ceasefire agreement as part of its strategy to extend its influence.
These efforts gained international support and assistance.
At the same time, international investments poured into the country, allowing U Thein Sein’s government to distance itself from over-reliance on Chinese investments.
At this time, China underwent its own leadership transition, with Xi Jinping becoming president.
After Xi assumed power in March 2013, relations between China and Myanmar began to shift, diverging from the previous military era.
The suspension of the Myitsone Dam project, the cancellation of the Kyaukphyu-Kunming railway project, and the actions of Chinese companies like Wanbao, known for disregarding environmental concerns and local rights, faced increasing public and civil society criticism.
As a result, despite China’s numerous economic collaborations with the Myanmar military government following its outward-looking strategy, relations between China and Myanmar took a downturn during U Thein Sein’s administration.
The Myanmar military also began to escalate its military pressure on Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that had not signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and groups it did not recognize, despite efforts by U Thein Sein’s government to promote the NCA.
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and United Wa State Army (UWSA), both based along the China-Myanmar border, refused to sign the NCA, while the military refused to acknowledge the Northern Brotherhood Alliance, an alliance of three ethnic armed groups.
Then conflicts resumed along the China-Myanmar border, and during the Kokang conflict in 2015, relations between China and Myanmar reached their lowest point.
This conflict also angered Chinese businessmen who could not progress with their investments, leading Xi Jinping to famously ask, “Who lost Myanmar?”
At the time of Xi’s rise to power, China was dealing with numerous economic challenges.
Since the 1980s, China’s economic growth has been driven by an export-oriented policy and as production increased, the challenge of finding enough markets to meet the rising demand emerged.
Consequently, China expanded its foreign investments, but many Chinese companies, especially in countries like Myanmar, faced reputational damage due to opaque and self-serving practices.
Despite opening its economy and achieving domestic growth, China’s local governments were struggling with debt, leaving them unable to repay loans.
This situation resulted in rising unemployment and economic distress, a familiar problem faced by capitalist economies.
British-American geographer David Harvey described this phenomenon as “when capital can no longer find profitable avenues for investment due to various reasons, it leads to a crisis. In such situations, excess capital begins to manifest in the form of surplus money, commodities, and industrial capacity. This, in turn, drives the economy toward conditions of mass unemployment and overaccumulation of capital.”
For China, this issue could become a threat to the Communist Party’s grip on power, making it a key challenge for Xi Jinping.
“Governments in capitalist-leaning countries, including China, must successfully manage and resolve such crises. Failure to do so could lead to significant social unrest and potentially result in the removal of the government from power,” The Netherlands-based civil society research organization, Transnational Institute (TNI), stated in its report on “Marketizing the Silk Road”.
In 2015, Xi Jinping rebranded the initiative originally known as “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) to the now widely recognized “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI).
The BRI is viewed by the international community as a grand geopolitical strategy spearheaded by Xi’s administration, reflecting China’s growing influence and global ambitions.
Myanmar holds a key geographical position in BRI, providing China with an alternative maritime route to avoid the Strait of Malacca.
At the time of Xi’s rise, U Thein Sein’s government was increasingly aligning with Western countries.
The military leaders in Myanmar, however, due to bitter historical experiences, did not fully trust China and harbored anti-Chinese sentiments.
Under Thein Sein, Myanmar’s relations with the United States improved, and the government also strengthened ties with countries like Japan and India, which sought to counter China’s influence.
At the same time, China sought to exert greater influence over the ethnic armed groups along its border.
Ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar, much like the Burmese Communist Party before them, remained heavily reliant on China. At the same time, these groups face immense pressure to resist the ongoing military offensives by the Myanmar army, placing them in a precarious position with limited options.
After U Thein Sein’s government ended and the NLD took power, China expressed concern that Myanmar would draw closer to Western countries.
However, the Myanmar military significantly intensified the conflict in northern Rakhine State, which had been ignited during President U Thein Sein’s administration and left for the NLD government to manage.
Following the outbreak of the Rohingya crisis, the relationship between the NLD government, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and liberal countries deteriorated.
For the NLD, China became a crucial economic partner by necessity.
Thus, the NLD government joined China’s BRI projects, despite concerns that China’s lopsided agreements could threaten Myanmar’s sovereignty.
The NLD government sought to negotiate more favorable agreements with China, aiming to secure better terms than those reached by former military leaders, which were perceived as unequal profit-sharing deals.
Both domestic and international experts also warned of the need to avoid falling into China’s debt trap.
China, meanwhile, began to adjust its approach, seeking to mitigate its image as a self-serving partner.
In 2020, Xi Jinping visited Myanmar, securing commitments for BRI projects.
Along with economic agreements, China pressed ethnic armed groups along the border to sign the NCA.
BRI projects are concentrated in Kachin, Shan, and Rakhine States, where ethnic armed groups heavily rely on Chinese support.
China shows little regard for the reasons behind why these ethnic resistance groups are resisting the Myanmar military with its support.
The Chinese Communist government, despite having come to power through its own revolutionary struggle, places little emphasis on claims that these ethnic insurgent groups are fighting due to the Myanmar government and military leaders’ dominance over economic resources, lack of national equality, and absence of self-determination. These issues, which drive revolution, are not a priority for China in its approach to the conflict.
At the same time, Myanmar’s military leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, reduced his engagement with China, turning instead to countries like India.
For instance, Myanmar accepted a submarine from India instead of China, and Myanmar military officers began receiving training in India.
Domestically, efforts have been made to exclude northern alliance groups from political negotiations, while also attempting to suppress them through military force.
The new military leadership, which aims to establish a renewed military dictatorship, consistently calls for ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to disarm, without addressing the underlying causes of their armed struggle, much like China’s approach.
The NLD government also began to believe that sustainable peace could only be achieved if it could extend its political power to the point where it could effectively control the military’s influence.
However, the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conferences stalled due to military opposition.
Despite growing international criticism over issues such as the Rohingya crisis, the conflict involving the Arakan Army, and legal cases like the Victoria incident, the Myanmar military and its influential circles continued to undermine stability under the civilian government’s name.
These actions damaged Myanmar’s international reputation, but domestically, the NLD government remained widely supported by the majority of the population.
The success in managing the COVID-19 pandemic was largely due to strong public adherence to government measures, reflecting the NLD government’s continued legitimacy and strong public approval at home.
Despite the looming elections during the pandemic, the NLD remained confident in its public support.
However, both the military and opposition groups pressured for the election to be postponed.
Ultimately, the election proceeded smoothly, and the NLD won by a larger margin than in 2015.
With slogans like “final battle” echoing across the country, the public believed that the NLD government could remove the military from politics.
Even as the military threatened to seize power, the public stood firmly behind the NLD.
In major cities, banners supporting the NLD’s victory were displayed in anticipation of the third parliamentary session, defying the military’s allegations of electoral fraud.
The NLD government did not address these allegations.
“If they responded, it would only legitimize the military’s claims, which would tarnish Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s image and the party’s political standing. If the votes were scrutinized, an emergency might be declared, and the military would seize power like in 1958,” remarked a political analyst based in Yangon.
In the morning when the parliament was set to convene to form a new government, the Myanmar military seized power.
China neither supported nor opposed the coup led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, with whom they had not always enjoyed smooth relations.
Instead, China’s response was largely neutral, maintaining the position that the military takeover was an internal matter and focusing primarily on ensuring that their own economic interests in Myanmar would not be affected by the political upheaval.
China expected the Myanmar military to manage the situation, given its experience with previous coups.
However, this coup differed from the past.
In 1958, the coup was legitimized when Prime Minister U Nu stepped aside, and it was done in accordance with the constitution.
In 1962, the public had lost faith in parliamentary politics, and many believed that the military would save the nation.
In 1988, the military manipulated the public with promises of elections, suppressing the popular uprising.
However, by 2021, the public had learned from past coups, and with rising political awareness and advancements in technology, the situation was vastly different.
Public protests against the military coup emerged rapidly online as soon as the coup was announced, with digital platforms becoming the first space for widespread opposition.
Despite the military, now transformed into the State Administration Council, attempting to conduct psychological operations and control the narrative through online channels, they were unable to prevent the large-scale public uprising that soon followed on the ground.
Technological advancements enabled information to flow freely, and people could quickly gather facts.
Social media platforms became a form of public resistance, with protests not only taking place in the streets but also on these digital networks.
The military junta’s violent suppression of protests quickly spread worldwide via social media.
At the same time, people were able to observe other struggles against oppression globally.
The Myanmar military was committing widespread violence against its people.
Protestors who had fled from military crackdowns reported seeing similar events happening in multiple locations through their mobile phones.
“While hiding, I pulled out my phone and saw that shootings and killings were happening everywhere. Outside, the sounds of soldiers shouting and gunfire were heartbreaking,” recounted a man in his 30s.
The more the public resisted, the more brutal the military became in suppressing protests.
Informed by informants, soldiers ambushed protestors, shooting them down.
Many young people holding signs were killed by soldiers’ gunfire.
Faced with the harrowing reality of witnessing friends and family members being shot and killed, or violently arrested by soldiers, many individuals turned to armed resistance in their pursuit of justice.
“We’re all going to be killed; we can’t just fight back with our bare hands anymore. These soldiers are no longer human,” said one young man, who had been struck by a rubber bullet during the protests.
Young people who left the cities to take up arms against the military dictatorship were once active participants in urban protests, determined to fight for a freer and more just future.
They had participated in both daytime and nighttime protests, chanting slogans demanding the junta’s removal from power.
However, with these young activists gone, urban protests dwindled under the military’s violent crackdowns.
This gave the military junta the opportunity to hunt down and arrest government officials who joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and other activists.
“Even now, we are afraid when our guest lists are checked. There is no sense of security,” said one education CDM.
Whenever protests arose in the cities, the military responded with violent crackdowns, instilling fear.
However, armed resistance emerged in rural areas, eventually leading to a transition to full-blown armed revolution.
In 2021 and 2022, the military junta violently suppressed anti-coup activists in the central regions of Myanmar and carried out destructive operations against local armed resistance forces.
Similar acts of brutality were committed in the Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Karenni regions.
However, the resistance grew stronger, and the junta was unable to stop the revolution by the action that resulted the mass displacement of tens of thousands of people and the destruction by fire of thousands of villages.
Although the military junta has continuously threatened the people’s fundamental human right to life through acts of violence, China has never condemned these actions.
In late 2022, as the junta’s military strength weakened, it held meetings with China, leading to the transfer of some troops from northern Shan State to Karenni State.
Over two years, Karenni State emerged as a significant center of military resistance, with the unity of local Karenni youth and youth from across the country, even reaching the capital, Loikaw.
Due to its proximity to Naypyidaw, the junta has been attempting to regain control of Karenni State.
Politically weakened and lacking legitimacy, the military regime has increasingly engaged in negotiations with China.
SAC secured assurances from the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) along the Chinese border not to engage in direct combat. Shortly after, the military leadership indicated plans to restart the Myitsone Dam project.
However, on 27 October, 2023, citing the issue of online scamming businesses, China signaled its northern allies to launch military operations in northern Shan State, marking a significant shift in the military landscape.
Following the start of Operation 1027, there was a change in the military dynamics.
Observers began to view the Myanmar military as no longer possessing its former combat effectiveness.
After the junta lost control of Laukkai, China brokered a ceasefire through the Heqing Agreement, facilitating a bilateral truce.
Meanwhile, the economic crisis within Myanmar worsened, and the junta became further entrenched in widespread difficulties.
Faced with limited options, the military junta decided to enact compulsory military conscription.
After the coup, job opportunities became increasingly scarce, and unemployment rates soared.
In addition to the lack of employment opportunities, the youth have also had to confront issues of personal insecurity due to the junta’s tight control. The military conscription law introduced during this time further threatened the youth’s right to live freely.
Following the Heqing Agreement, the military junta swiftly enacted the conscription law, allowing it to illegally recruit tens of thousands of new soldiers within five months.
The junta then began planning to retake Laukkai, a town that had been the site of clashes between the military and MNDAA forces in 2009.
For the military, recapturing Laukkai is crucial to changing their precarious situation, aligning with China’s wishes.
The MNDAA and TNLA have grown stronger with the inclusion of young people who oppose the military coup.
China, for its part, sought to secure control over strategic territories linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), using military means to achieve its goals.
However, the ethnic resistance groups, which some considered to be under China’s influence, remained focused on dismantling the military dictatorship and establishing a federal union based on equality.
Thus, amidst political and military maneuvers, the second phase of Operation 1027 emerged, and the junta celebrated its victory over the Kokang Army (MNDAA). The northeastern military headquarters in Lashio fell into the hands of the resistance forces.
Meanwhile, Mandalay also became a key military target for the combined resistance forces.
The loss of Northeastern Command enraged supporters of the military leadership.
At the same time, China began exerting increasing pressure on the junta to implement changes.
In August of this year, rumors surfaced of an internal coup within the military, following a meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and SAC leadership. The fall of Northeastern Command also gave rise to anti-China sentiments within the military ranks.
After Wang Yi’s departure, the military junta took decisive steps to push forward its election plans.
Recently, China issued warnings to TNLA, which had been engaged in battles alongside People Defense Forces- Mandalay (MDY-PDF), and MNDAA also declared that it would not seize Mandalay or Taunggyi and would not cooperate with the National Unity Government (NUG) or secede from the Union.
In the past few days, SAC has, for the first time in over three years, invited PDF forces to engage in political dialogue, claiming a desire for negotiations.
This is a result of the increasing pressure from China for the junta to hold elections based on the 2008 Constitution. However, the resistance forces do not trust SAC’s offer.
This is seen as a result of China pressuring the junta to hold elections as soon as possible to revive the 2008 Constitution.
However, revolutionary groups remain distrustful of SAC’s overtures.
They have made it clear to the public that they are committed to establishing a federal democratic union, gaining widespread public support.
SAC’s election will be conducted under the 2008 Constitution, providing no guarantees for the establishment of a federal union.
Political figures preparing for the election are also facing public dissatisfaction for failing to oppose SAC Army’s human rights violations.
Meanwhile, the public is demanding justice for the crimes committed by military generals, who have so far evaded punishment.
China’s $3 billion loan offer, which keeps the military council afloat, and the forced agreements surrounding the BRI projects may further entrap the country in debt.
In addition, China’s three-billion-dollar aid package, which has been seen as a lifeline for the junta, along with the BRI projects forced upon the country, may trap Myanmar in a debt crisis, making it even harder for the nation to recover.
The Myanmar military, which had opposed the principle of self-determination for ethnic groups during the 21st Century Panglong Conference, is now implementing an election orchestrated by China, which some view as a threat to the country’s sovereignty.
“China only cares about advancing its own business interests. It does not care about anything else. It will work with whoever is in power. If there is no good governance in Myanmar, China will take over the country with debt. The locals will starve while the Chinese flourish,” a political commentator based in Yangon remarked.
However, the revolutionary forces are unwilling to cooperate with the SAC’s election.
The public also hopes that the revolutionary groups will continue to oppose the military and establish a genuine federal democracy.
Despite SAC’s ongoing human rights abuses, the 2008 Constitution does not include any provisions to hold them accountable for these atrocities.
Thus, a government formed through a Chinese-backed SAC held election is unlikely to prosecute the military for its crimes.
“We have suffered so much. These military leaders must be held accountable. Otherwise, the cycle of injustice and oppression will repeat itself,” said a young supporter of the armed resistance.